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Approaching the topic
 Topic
 social aspects of carbon tax reform and revenue recycling
 public acceptability
 suitable topic for a policy discussion
 Methods
 CGE simulations
 representative choice experiment and other surveys
 State of the project
 CGE results
 working paper on the choice experiment
 SFOE report
 no CGE paper yet
Introduction
Structure of the talk
 The project: SEPIA
 Literature on carbon taxes and income distribution
 Model and data
 Scenarios
 Results
 Carbon taxes: efficient? inequitable? disliked?
 How (not) to design and promote carbon taxes in Switzerland
Introduction
The SEPIA project
 Title: Social Cushioning of Energy Price Increases and Public Acceptability
 Project components:
 Simulations with the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GENESwIS:
 How do revenue recycling options affect income distribution and efficiency?
 Representative national survey (choice experiment) with 1200 respondents:
 What design of CO2 levies is most acceptable to citizens?
 Integrated analysis:
 Respondents are informed about the simulation results.
 Search for acceptable, environmentally effective and efficient designs.
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Université de Genève: Frédéric Varone
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Distributional effects depend on recycling
A carbon tax is regressive
USA, Metcalf 1999
Revenue recycling can help
10 EU Member States, Barker and Köhler 1998
USA, Rausch et al. 2011
Revenue recycling by:
 income tax reduction regressive
 lump-sum per capita progressive
Literature
A carbon tax is mildly progressive with revenue
recycling through the income tax
USA regional, Oladosu and Rose 2006
 source of income effect is progressive
Literature
... and on the region
A carbon tax is highly progressive even before
revenue recycling
British Columbia (Canada), Beck et al. 2015
 use of income effect is small (electricity mostly from hydro)
 source of income effect dominates (high income households with a
higher share of labor income; capital mobility assumed)
Fuel taxation is highly progressive in developing
and emerging economies
anthology, Sterner 2011
e.g. in Indonesia:
Yusuf/Resosudarmo
use of income effect is progressive
 higher income households spend more on vehicle fuels
 lowest income households cannot afford public transport
source of income effect is progressive
 higher income households receive factor income from sectors
strongly affected by fuel tax reform
Literature
Developing and emerging economies
Revenue recycling lump-sum per capita is the
(only) progressive option
Ecoplan 2012 and Imhof 2012
 But: trade-off between efficiency and equity
 Imhof 2012: “If distributional equity is considered as well, per-
capita lump-sum rebatement leads to a progressive tax reform at a
moderate cost”
 Ecoplan 2012:
 households with kids benefit strongly from lump-sum payments
 no significant influence of rural or urban place of residence
Literature
Switzerland
GENESwIS
 computable general equilibrium model
 dynamic-recursive version
 multi-sectoral single country model with Armington trade
 15 private household categories
 taxes, public budget & equal yield constraint
 putty-clay capital structure
 emissions trading
Model and data
GENESwIS: sectoral aggregation
 Sectors
Model and data
 Commodities
GENESwIS: household expenditure
Model and data
GENESwIS: sectoral cost functions
Model and data
GENESwIS: Elasticities of substition
 Industry & services: Mohler/Müller 2012 & Ban/Okagawa 2008
 Doubling in 25 years
 Armington: Hertel 1997 & Burniaux/Truong 2002
Model and data
Household data
 Household categories
 families:
• working population with vs. without children, retired population
• each group differentiated into 5 groups of standard of living
 spatial differentiation:
• inner cities, agglomerations, rural households
• each group differentiated into 5 groups of standard of living
 Data from household budget surveys 2007/2008
 aggregated by Ecoplan (Ecoplan 2012) to fit 2008 energy IO table
(Nathani et al. 2013)
 substantial data manipulation necessary
Model and data
Household data: some observations
 The share of expenditure for energy decreases in income.
 Tax and contribution ratios are U-shaped in income.
 Main reason: health insurance.
 The tax system is mildly progressive (with large cantonal differences).
 Pensioners have
 a higher per capita income,
 a higher tax ratio (but they hardly pay social security contributions),
 a higher expenditure share of heating fuels (3.6% vs. 2.3%),
 a lower expenditure share of transport fuels (1.4% vs. 2.3%).
 Rural households have
 a lower per capita income,
 a higher expenditure share for transport fuels than inner city
households (2.3% vs. 1.5%),
 but a lower expenditure share for heating fuels (2.1% vs. 3.1%).
Model and data
Household data: children
 Having children increases the probability of belonging to the
bottom quintile as well as to the two bottom quintiles:
bottom 20% bottom 40%
 kids 26.3% 54.0%
 no kids 10.0% 25.6%
 The share of labor income is higher (79.8% vs. 63.9%)
 The income share of social benefits is lower (14.0% vs. 24.9%)
Model and data
GENESwIS: Marginal tax rates
Model and data
GENESwIS: Endogenous tax rate changes
 The model taxes activities at marginal rates.
 Transfers ensure that tax payments correspond to average rates.
 Equal yield: marginal tax rates are endogenous.
 Average tax rates also need to be endogenous -> adjust transfers.
Model and data
Scenarios and recycling variants
Scenarios
 Baseline: “weiter wie bisher” (Prognos 2012)
 Policy scenario: CO2 targets of the new energy policy
 International offset prices: 10 CHF/t in 2015; +10% per year
 Imperfect social targeting: 70% - 25% - 5% - 0% - 0%
CO2 tax rates (CHF2008/t)
Results
GHG emissions (in Mt CO2e)
Results
Impact on aggregate welfare
Results
Welfare changes (in % in 2035)
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GHG emissions (offset scenarios, in Mt CO2e)
Results
Impact on aggregate welfare (offset scenarios)
Results
Insights from the surveys
 very little support for high carbon tax rates
 very little support for pure tax reforms
 in the setting of a choice experiment, information is key to the
acceptability of efficient and equitable designs
 Informing about the environmental effectiveness of the CO2 levy reduces
the (generally strong) demand for environmental earmarking of revenues.
 Informing about distributional effects leads to demands for progressive
designs.
Acceptability
Example of a choice card
Acceptability
SEPIA references on acceptability
 Carattini, S., A. Baranzini, P. Thalmann, F. Varone and F. Vöhringer (2016):
Green taxes in a post-Paris world: are millions of nays inevitable?
(based on a representative choice experiment)
 Baranzini, A. and S. Carattini (2016): Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling:
testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data
(based on an unrepresentative survey in Geneva)
 Baranzini, A., M. Caliskan and S. Carattini 2014: Economic Prescriptions and
Public Responses to Climate Policy (based on interviews)
 Philippe Thalmann 2016: Quelle est l'utilisation préférée de la recette d'une taxe
sur l'énergie?
(analysis of the VOX survey on the Greenliberals’ energy tax initiative)
 All included in the report: Vöhringer et al. (2016): Social Cushioning of Energy
Price Increases and Public Acceptability, Swiss Federal Office of Energy.
Results
Efficient? Inequitable? Disliked?
 Efficient? Rather: potentially cost-effective.
 No double dividend for high tax rates (although they are needed for
ambitious targets, including the taxation of transport fuels).
 Good news from other studies: secondary benefits can be substantial.
 Marginal cost deviations due to voluntary commitments and emissions
trading are an issue for cost-effectiveness.
 Inequitable? Not necessarily.
 No serious social issues with CO2 tax reform: Setting aside a small portion of
the revenues for lump-sum recycling is sufficient to address them.
 No serious issues for the urban/rural divide (although rural households spend
more on transport fuels and less on heating fuels)
 Disliked? Yes.
 Especially when proposed tax rates are high.
 Serious doubts about the effectiveness.
 Serious fear for detrimental impacts on competitiveness.
 The concept of the double dividend is not understood.
Conclusions
Considerations for Switzerland: equity
 Transfers can be designed such that any distribution
goal can be reached (this study & 2nd theorem of welfare economics).
• Some instruments:
• health insurance lump sum payments or premium reductions
• child benefits
• old age pensions
• AVS/AHV contributions
• Difficulties:
• losers needed (no double dividend)
• difficult distributive politics due to apparent beneficiaries
• federalism: Who gets the tax revenues? Who pays the transfers?
• increased (federal) budget
• affected sectors (e.g. transport, natural gas and mineral oil)
• preference for ecological use of tax revenues
Conclusions
 clearly preferred by voters
• but less efficient (domestically) or equitable
• rescue through secondary benefits of domestic abatement?
• environmental programs with high benefits?
• existing domestic (compensation) schemes
• lack of projects?
• delineation between programs (Klik, EnAW, Cleantech)
• international offsets
• when counted towards the CH goal: cheaper than domestic
abatement
• mind the domestic CH goals (-30% in 2030 w.r.t. 1990)
• buying additional abatement is cheap and effective
• but: trust issues with international offsets
• not necessarily the type of ecological earmarking which has
high acceptance
Conclusions
Environmental earmarking
How (not) to design and promote carbon taxes
in Switzerland (to be discussed)
 Talk about climate and environment, not double dividends.
 Inform about the effectiveness of carbon taxes.
 Inform about the compatibility of carbon taxes with economic and
social objectives.
 Finance environmental programs (but which ones?).
 Set aside some revenue for lump-sum recycling to address social
concerns.
 Also reduce taxes to improve the efficiency of the reform (too
complicated?).
 Make the lump-sum recycling visible (send a check or at least let
Parliament discuss about it).
 Communicate about bonuses for desirable environmental behavior
(instead of punishment through taxes, e.g. “Lenkungsabgabe”).
